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ill

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
BARBARA CROUSE
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 950119-CA
vs.
HUMAN RESOURCES CONSULTING
GROUP, INC., a Utah corporation, and
ROBERT J. THURSTON.

Argument Priority 15

Defendants /Appellants.

BRIEF OF THE APPELLEE
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Annotated
§78-2a-3(2)(k).
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
There are no constitutional or statutory provisions which are determinative
a the issues raised in this appeal.
STATEMENT Or RELEVANT TACTS
1.

In February 1988, Crouse was contacted by Thurston regarding

providing services for HRCG for which Crouse would be paid a yearly wage plus

1

medical insurance. Crouse would also be reimbursed for all expenses associated
with the services provided.1
2.

On or about January 15, 1989, Crouse and HRCG entered into a

written agreement whereby Crouse was to perform consulting services and
demonstrations on behalf of HRCG.2
3.

Crouse performed consulting services and demonstrations on behalf

of HRCG up until about November 1989. 3
4.

In November 1989, Thurston directed Crouse to perform customer

support work. This made it such that Crouse could not leave the office to perform
demonstrations. Crouse continued performing customer support work for HRCG
up until October 1990. 4
5.

During the time period in which Crouse was performing customer

support services, Crouse felt that she was not being properly compensated. At the
request of Thurston, Crouse prepared and submitted billings wherein Crouse
believed she was owed approximately $48,600 from HRCG.5

1

Crouse T. 10 - 12. Finding of Fact 11 4.

2

Crouse T. 13. Thurston T. 98 - 99. Ex. #2. Finding of Fact 11 5.

3

Crouse T. 1 4 - 16. Thurston T. 1333. Finding of Fact 11 6.

4

Crouse T. 16, 48, 64. Thurston T. 133. Finding of Fact 11 11 8 - 10.

5

Crouse T. 17 - 18. Ex. #3 - #8. Finding of Fact U 11.
2

6.

HRCG responded to these billings on or about October 2, 1990,

questioning some of the invoices submitted by Crouse.

HRCG presented a

proposal for payment for Crouse's services performed.6
7.

HRCG, on or about October 4, 1990, provided an accounting

breakdown as to HRCG's position along with an offer of $24,661.62 as payment
for Grouse's services performed.7
8.

Shortly thereafter, Crouse and Thurston met to discuss the settlement

proposal using the October 4, 1990, letter as a beginning point. During this
meeting, Thurston made handwritten changes to the October 4, 1990, letter
changing the ofifer to $28,911.62 for Crouse's services performed.8
9.

On or about October 18, 1990, Crouse wrote a letter to HRCG

indicating that she was in agreement with the modifications made to the October
4, 1990, as discussed, except for paragraph 8c. 9
10.

Shortly thereafter, Crouse and Thurston met again to discuss

paragraph 8c. In this meeting, Thurston agreed to pay Crouse an additional
$5,625 from paragraph 8c. Thurston handwrote $5,625 below the previous ofifer,

6

Crouse T. 19, 37. Thurston T. 105. Ex. #9. Finding of Fact f 12.

7

Crouse T. 20. Thurston T. 107. Finding of Fact 11 13.

8

Crouse T. 20 - 22. Thurston T. 106 - 108, 136 - 137. Ex. #10. Finding
of Fact If 14.
9

Crouse T. 23 - 25. Thurston T. 137. Ex. #12. Finding of Fact 11 15.
3

and Thurston handwrote $34,536.62 at the bottom of the page. Crouse accepted
this settlement offer of $34,536.62. 10
11.

On or about October 25, 1990, HRCG paid to Crouse $14,000 of the

agreed to settlement amount. HRCG did not make any more payments on the
balance of $20,536.62 owing.11

SUMMARY Qr THE ARGUMENT
HRCG in its brief, has failed to marshal the evidence in support of the
challenged finding, and fails to show that the evidence does not support the
finding of the trial court. Instead, on all issues, HRCG has merely selected those
facts from trial that are most favorable to its position, and then reargues those
facts to this court on appeal. Accordingly, HRCGfs appeal should be dismissed.
HRCG argues in its brief that there is no evidence to support the trial
court's finding of fact that an agreement was reached between the parties. Crouse
presented credible evidence in testimony and documentation which supports the
trial court's finding of fact. The policy of the appellate courts of Utah is to not
disturb a verdict on a factual question which is supported by any competent
evidence. Due regard is given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the

10

Crouse T. 26 - 27, 45, 73, 94. Thurston T. 138 - 139. Ex. #13. Finding
of Fact 11 16.
11

Crouse T. 27 - 28, 34 - 36, 46. Thurston T. 139. Ex. #14. Finding of
Fact 1111 17, 20.
4

credibility of the witnesses. The findings must be so lacking in support that they
are against the clear weight of the evidence, thus clearly erroneous. In order to
challenge the trial court's findings of fact, an appellant must first marshal the
evidence in support of the findings and then demonstrate that even viewing it in
the light most favorable to the court below, the evidence is insufficient to support
the findings. HRCG has not met this high burden, and there is sufficient evidence
to support the finding of the trial court.
The trial court properly applied the facts in this case to the appropriate legal
principles in concluding that an agreement was reached to resolve the dispute
between Crouse and HRCG. The evidence presented demonstrates that the
required contract elements were present in the agreement. This is supported by
written documents and oral testimony found in the record. Furthermore, HRCG's
partial performance in satisfaction of the agreement removes any alleged
requirement that the agreement be signed by the parties. Also, the evidence of
Crouse compromising her claim and relinquishing her rights to the additional
sums to which she believed she was owed clearly qualifies as consideration for the
settlement agreement. Accordingly, the settlement agreement is enforceable as
found by the trial court and HRCGfs appeal must fall.

5

ARQUMENT
POINT I
HRCG HAS NOT PROPERLY MARSHALED THE
EVIDENCE, AND HAS NOT MET ITS BURDEN OF
PROOF IN THIS APPEAL.
HRCG appeals from a judgment entered against it on behalf of Crouse. To
challenge a finding of fact, HRCG must marshal the evidence in support of the
trial court's findings and then demonstrate that, even when viewing the evidence
in the light most favorable to the trial court's findings, that the evidence is
nevertheless insufficient

to support those finding and therefore

"clearly

erroneous". State v. Walker. 743 P.2d 191 (Utah 1987); URCP 52(a).
HRCG has not in this case properly marshaled all the evidence, let alone in
the light most favorable to the findings made by the trial court. Rather, HRCG has
selected specific portions of the evidence that are most favorable to its position,
even though they are contrary to the findings of the trial court, and neglects to
refer to the evidence that supports the findings. HRCG is simply rearguing those
facts that were asserted and rejected by the trial court. The appellate courts are
not permitted to weigh the evidence de novo. In re Estate of BartelL 776 P.2d 885
(Utah 1989).
The Utah Supreme Court has stated in reference to a n appellants failure to
marshal the evidence:
If the appellant fails to marshal the evidence, the appellate court
assumes that the record supports the findings of the trial court and

6

proceeds to review the accuracy of the lower court's conclusions of
law and the application of the law in the case.

Saunders v, Sharp, 806 P.2d 198, 199 (Utah 1991)
HRCG, by failing to properly marshal the evidence, ignores the rules designated
to give stability to the rulings of the trial court.
HRCG must also demonstrate that the finding of the court are against the
clear weight of the evidence, thus making them clearly erroneous. In re Estate
ofBartell. 776 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989) furthermore stands for the proposition
that:
Whether the facts have been found by a jury or a judge, appellants
should recognize that the burden of overturning factual findings is a
heavy one, reflective of the fact that we do not sit to retry cases
submitted on disputed facts.
HRCG has not met this heavy burden of demonstrating that the findings of the
trial court are clearly erroneous, but appears to be doing exactly that which the
appellate courts are not prepared to do, that is, retry the case on disputed fact.
HRCG, as is more fully set forth in the individual arguments below, has not
met its heavy burden for marshaling the evidence, showing that trial court's
findings are so lacking that they are against the clear weight of the evidence, or
demonstrating that the trial court abused its discretion. As such, HRCG has not
properly followed appellate requirements and the rulings by the trial court should
be affirmed.

7

POINT II
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL SUPPORTS
THE TRIAL COURTS FINDING THAT HRCG ENTERED
INTO A SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT WITH CROUSE
In Point I of Appellant's Brief. HRCG challenges the trial court's Finding of
Fact No. 16 which reads as follows:
Shortly thereafter, [Crouse] and [HRCG] met again to discuss
paragraph 8c. In this meeting, [HRCG] agreed to pay [Crouse] a n
additional $5,625 from paragraph 8c. [HRCG] handwrote $5,625
below the previous offer, and [HRCG] handwrote $34,536.62 at the
bottom of the page. [Crouse] accepted this settlement offer of
$34,536.62. 1 2
When challenging a trial court's finding of fact, the appellant m u s t marshal
all the evidence supporting the finding that is being challenged. Alta Industries
Limited v. Hurst. 846 P.2d 1282, 1286 (Utah 1993). After marshaling all the
evidence, the appellant must then demonstrate that despite this evidence, the trial
court's finding is so lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of
evidence, t h u s making them clearly erroneous. Wade v. Stangl. 869 P.2d 9, 12
(Utah App. 1994). HRCG in its brief fails to meet this heavy burden.
As background to assist the court in understanding the context of Finding
of Fact 11 16, a brief summary of the facts leading up to the events set forth in that
Finding is provided. Crouse began working for HRCG in 1988 performing
demonstrations, sales, and installations on behalf of HRCG.13 In J a n u a r y 1989,

12

Findings of Fact H 16. R. 62.

13

Crouse T. 10 - 12. Finding of Fact 11 4.
8

a contract was signed regarding the services Crouse would provide to HRCG and
the compensation she would be paid for said services on a commission basis, 14
There came a time, however, when HRCG needed someone to perform its customer
support,

Mr, Thurston, president of HRCG, directed Crouse to perform the

customer support services for HRCG.

These duties prevented Crouse from

continuing to perform demonstrations, sales and installations along with their
related commissions. 15
Accordingly, there came a time when Crouse and HRCG began to discuss
what compensation Crouse was to be paid for her services for HRCG during the
time she was performing customer support. At the request of HRCG, Crouse
submitted billings to HRCG in the amount $48,680.44.

This was Crouse's

accounting of the compensation to which she believed she was entitled. 16 HRCG
acknowledged it owed compensation to Crouse for her services, but questioned
some of her billings. After exchanging letters and meeting on one occasion to
discuss the various items in the letters, the parties compromised or agreed all of
the items leaving except paragraph 8c. 17 (The status of the at this point in time
is reflected by Exhibit # 10 which is October 4, 1990, as modified by Mr.

14

Crouse T. 13. Thurston T. 98 - 99. Ex. #2. Finding of Fact 11 5.

15

Crouse T. 1 6 , 4 8 , 6 4 . Thurston T. 133. Finding of Fact 1111 8 - 1 0 ,

16

Crouse T. 17 - 18. Ex. #3 - #8. Finding of Fact K 11.

17

Crouse T. 19 - 25. Thurston T. 105 - 108, 136 - 137. Ex. #9, #10, and
#12. Finding of Fact 1111 12 - 15.
9

Thurston's handwriting with a total offer of $28, 911,62,) The next events which
resulted in an agreement between the parties are reflected in Finding of Fact 11 16
which is being challenged by HRCG.
HRCG in its brief does not appear to challenge the first sentence of the
finding of fact and acknowledges that the parties did meet again to discuss
paragraph 8c. Both Crouse and Thurston testified that a meeting was held
wherein the parties discussed paragraph 8c. 18 Exhibit #13 further reflects this
meeting. Therefore, the evidence clearly supports this finding.
HRCG, however, appears to be asserting in its brief that there is no evidence
to support the second sentence of the finding, that HRCG agreed to pay Crouse
an additional $5,625. However, there is ample evidence which supports this
finding. Crouse testified that she discussed with Thurston why she would not
accept paragraph 8c as offered.

Crouse testified that during this meeting,

Thurston then agreed to add $5,625 to the previous offer of $28,911.62. 1 9
From this, and adding further support of the agreement comes the next
sentence of the finding. HRCG does not appear to directly challenge the third
sentence of the finding of fact that Thurston, President of HRCG handwrote
$5,625 below the previous offer, and then wrote $34,536.62 at the bottom of the
page. Crouse testified that Thurston again, in his own handwriting, modified the

Crouse T. 26 -27, 45, 73, 94. Thurston T. 138 - 139. Ex. #13.
Crouse T. 25 - 26, 45, 73, 94. Thurston T. 138 - 139. Ex. #13.
10

only remaining item which had yet to be agreed upon in the October 4, 1990.
letter, that being paragraph 8c. 20 These final handwritten modifications are
contained in Exhibit #13 which was admitted into evidence at trial.21
The final sentence of this findings indicates that Crouse accepted the offer
from HRCG in the amount of $34,536.62. Crouse testified that she met with
Thurston and negotiated a final settlement. Crouse testified that she agreed to
paragraph 8c in the additional amount of $5,625 for a total settlement of
$34,536.62 as described on Exhibit #13. 22 This became the final agreement
between the parties.
After the parties reached this agreement, HRCG indicated that the money
would be paid as soon as possible. On October 25. 1990. HRCG made its first
payment on the settlement agreement to Crouse in the amount of $14,000. 2 3
This partial performance of making a payment to Crouse further evidences that
HRCG did agree to settlement.
When making a determination as to facts of a case, the trial court, who is
the fact finder in this case, weighs the testimony and evidence which is presented.
As has been previously stated by this Court:

Crouse T. 26. 45, 73.
Court T. 32. R. 49.
Crouse T. 26 - 27. 94. Ex. #13.
Crouse T. 27 - 28. 46. Thurston T. 139. Ex. #14.
11

Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence,
shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall
be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility
of the witnesses. Bailey v. Call. 767 P.2d 138 (Utah App. 1989).
The Supreme Court has also stated that even though the record may contain
conflicting evidence, a trial court's finding which is supported by sufficient
evidence will be upheld. Clair W, Gladys Judd Family Ltd, v, Hutchings, 797 P.2d
1088, 1090 (Utah 1991).
In this case, the trial court heard the testimony of Crouse and Thurston and
received are reviewed documentary evidence. There is no question that there was
conflicting testimony from these witnesses as to what took place. But it is the role
of the trial court, who hears the live testimony, to judge the credibility of the
witnesses in conjunction with the documents submitted into evidence, and
determine the facts of the case. In so doing, the trial court believed the testimony
of Crouse.
HRCG in its brief simply reasserts the same argument that it presented at
trial. HRCG contends that because the trial court did not chose to believe the
testimony of Thurston, means that the findings are not justified under the law.
The trial court may choose to believe one witness over another when there is a
conflict in evidence. In re Estate of BartelL 776 P.2d. 885 (Utah 1989). Despite
the fact that HRCG may not agree with the trial courts rulings, the trial court
weighed the evidence and found in favor of Crouse. HRCG has not properly
marshaled the evidence or met its burden of showing the findings to be clearly

12

erroneous. In fact, as demonstrated in this argument, the trial court's finding in
this regard is supported by credible evidence and should not be disturbed.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY RULED THAT THE
PARTIES ENTERED INTO NEGOTIATIONS TO SETTLE
A DISPUTED CLAIM RESULTING IN AN ACCORD AND
SATISFACTION.
HRCG in its brief argues that the January 15, 1990, contract is the
controlling documents as to the agreement between the parties and the ultimate
settlement reached and therefore any change to the Agreement m u s t be done in
writing. This assertion is not supported by the facts and evidence in this case or
the law.
A.

THE TRIAL COURT WAS PRESENTED WITH ORAL AND
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE WHICH SUPPORT THE FINDING
THAT AN AGREEMENT WAS REACHED BETWEEN THE
PARTIES AND HRCG S PARTIAL PERFORMANCE OF THE
AGREEMENT WAIVES ANY CLAIM FOR THE NECESSITY
FOR ANY FURTHER WRITINGS.

A dispute arose between HRCG and Crouse as to what compensation
Crouse would receive for the services she provided between November 1989 and
October 1990.

This resulted in negotiations between the parties and the

exchanging of various writings which ultimately resulted in a n agreement.
Crouse first provided to HRCG an accounting of her time and expenses
indicating she was entitled to $48,680.44. 24

Crouse T. 17 - 18. Ex. #3 - #8.
13

From this, HRCG reviewed the

billings and invoices and responded by writing a letter to Crouse dated October
2, 1990. 2 5 HRCG sent a subsequent letter dated October 4, 1990.26 A meeting
was held between the parties to discuss the offer presented in the October 4, 1990
letter. This letter became the basis of the negotiations between the parties.
Handwritten changes to the October 4, 1990 offer were made by Thurston. 27 After
this meeting, Crouse wrote a letter to HRCG indicating her acceptance of
paragraphs 1 to 7, and paragraphs 8a and 8b as discussed in the meeting.
However paragraph 8c remained in dispute. 28
Ultimately, a meeting was held to discuss paragraph 8c. It was agreed that
HRCG would pay Crouse an additional $5,625 for a total of $34,536.62. This is
confirmed by the handwritten numbers by Thurston on the October 4, 1990. 29
HRCG indicated that it would pay the money as quickly as possible. 30
There is substantial writings prepared by both parties, some of which is
Thurston's own handwriting, which supports and substantiates that an agreement
was reached.

This alone is enough to support any "writing requirement".

25

Crouse T. 19,37. Thurston T. 105. Ex. #9. Finding of Fact 1112.

26

Crouse T. 20. Thurston T. 107. Finding of Fact 1113.

27

Crouse T. 20 - 22. Thurston T. 106 - 108, 136 - 137. Ex. #10. Finding
of Fact H14.
28

Crouse T. 24 - 25. Thurston T. 137. Ex. #12. Finding of Fact 1115.

29

Crouse T. 25 - 27, 45, 73, 94. Thurston T. 138 - 139. Ex. #13. Finding
of Fact 1116.
30

Crouse T. 27.
14

Nevertheless, after reaching this agreement, HRCG issued a check in the amount
of $14,000 as the first payment on the settlement, 31 This "part performance" on
the part of HRCG removes any previous requirement of a writing signed by both
parties.
The doctrine of part performance is a well established principle in contract
law. The part performance by a party acts to manifest its intent to be bound by
the negotiated agreement even if it was not signed by the parties. In Commercial
Union Associates v. Clayton. 863 P.2d 29 (Utah App. 1993), this court stated:
It is axiomatic that a party may become bound through its
performance to a contract that has not been signed. It is a
fundamental contract law that the parties may become bound by the
terms of a contract even though they did not sign the contract, where
they have otherwise indicated their acceptance of the contract, or led
the other party to believe that they have accepted the contract.
This Court also cited law from other jurisdictions in Commercial Union Associates
which support this principle that it is not always necessary for a parties signature
to create a binding document. The court went on to state that the assent to the
contract can be shown by the conduct of the parties. (Citing City and County of

Denver v, Adolph Poors Co,, 813 F.Supp. 1476, 1480 (D.Colo. 1993).)
In the case at hand, there is a significant amount of writing which sets forth
the agreement reached between the parties. HRCG!s argument that the agreement
is not enforceable because the documents were not signed by the parties, even
though it made a payment in partial performance of the agreement is contrary to
31

Crouse T. 27 - 28, 46. Thurston T. 139. Ex. #14. Finding of Fact 1117.
15

the law. The evidence presented and the applicable law support the trial courts
ruling that an agreement was reached between the parties, and the agreement is
binding on both parties.
B.

THE AGREEMENT MEETS ALL NECESSARY CONTRACTUAL
REQUIREMENTS.

In the case at hand, the settlement agreement contains all the necessary
elements to be binding on the parties. Without revisiting again all the facts
leading up to the final settlement agreement, a brief analysis of the final
agreement itself indicates that necessary elements have been met.
As described above in the previous arguments, the October 4, 1990, letter
provided the basis of the ongoing negotiations. In the final meeting between
Crouse and Thurston, HRCG ultimately offered to pay Crouse $34,536.62. Crouse
accepted that offer.32
HRCG now argues in its brief, however, that there was no consideration for
the agreement. This is contrary to the evidence and law. Consideration is "the
inducement to a contract, something of value given in return for performance or
a promise of performance by another" Barrons. Law Dictionary, (1984). In other
words, consideration represents the element of bargaining to indicate that each
party agrees to surrender something in return for what it is to receive.

Crouse T. 26 - 27. Ex. #13. Finding of Fact 11 16.
16

In the case at hand, Grouse performed customer support services for HRCG.
HRCG received the benefit of those services. Crouse believed she was entitled to
$48,680.44 for those services. 33 HRCG disputed that Crouse was owed that
much. Therefore, the parties negotiated until they reached a settlement in the
amount of $34,536.62. 3 4
From this evidence, it is clear that consideration existed in the final
settlement.

Crouse, in exchange for the $34,536.62 from HRCG, provided

customer support services for HRCG and relinquished her legal right to her claim
to the additional $14,143.82 to which she believed she was entitled. This meets
the element of consideration under the law. Accordingly, the agreement can not
be invalidated for lack of consideration and the finding of the trial court should
be upheld.
CONCLUSION
HRCG in this appeal is attempting to get a second shot at trying this case.
HRCG principally is rearguing the facts of the case to this Court. The trial court
heard all the evidence, and after weighing the evidence, found certain witnesses
and evidence to be more credible than others. The trial court sits in a position to
make these determinations, and on appeal, the appellate court will only overturn

33

Crouse T. 16 - 18. Ex. #3 - #8. Finding of Fact HIT 8 - 11.

34

Crouse T. 19 - 27. Ex. #9, #10, #12, and #13. Finding of Fact HH 12 -

16.
17

such a ruling if it clearly erroneous. This is a heavy burden which HRCG has not
met.
The trial court ruled from the evidence that there arose a dispute between
the parties as to the amount of compensation Crouse was due. The trial court
ruled that the parties did enter into negotiations to resolve the dispute. There was
an offer, acceptance and consideration to support the agreement. An agreement
was reach in the amount of $34,536.62. The court further ruled that HRCG paid
$14,000 in partial satisfaction of the agreement and HRCG has breach this
agreement by failing to pay the remaining balance in the amount of $20,536.62,
together with interest and costs.
The Judgment in favor of Crouse by the trial court should be affirmed in all
respects.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this JJ_ day of April, 1995.
WALSTAD & BABCOCK

By:
Brian
Attorney lor Appelle

18

ADDENDUM

19

> N^O
October 4, 1330
Ms. Barbara Crcuse
Comprehensive Benefits Service!
South Ledgemont Drive
SLC, UT
Dear

f

IT

6oo

Barb:

Here is rny best efforts of where we stand on expenses:
OWE
1. On J&rt 3, 1383 you gave rne an invoice, attached
1 owed you $30,£30 for consulting and sales

BARB

$.*U, £5u. 00
(14, 500.00)
$15,750.00

Recording to your invoice, 1 had paid $14,500
BALANCE
* * ' "

£. From the fol2tV=«wing checks, HftCG had paid for
Invoices 1-5
Check 5£4, 5/3/8B 667.73,
Check 1029, 7/£l/88 433.15, Check 433, 9/12/88
$630 (paid Invoices £,4, 5 ) , Check 1050, 3/£6/88
$1000 (paid Invoice 3 for $1044)

0. 00

£,416.90

3. On March 13, 1983 you gave me invoices 6-l£

(£,416.90 A /v>

4. On April 1, 1383, I gave you check #749 for

$15,750.00

BALANCE
5. On October 1, 1330, you gave rne invoices 13-16
Question
Question
Question
Question

#1
#£
#3
#4

3, 043; 07

66-88 phone bill not found
OK and approved by Rob
agreed to pay 5 0 % of air
agreed to pay 5 0 % of ca,r rental

(

66.88)

( 1£9.Q0) (*-^-3(S703T*
\

BALANCE

$18,461. 16 .

6. Checks paid from HRCG in 1989- $17,910.41
l/£6
#7£7
1/5
4/£l
5/£6
#116
6/£6
167
8/15
£80
9/6
£97
9/£3
141
BALANCE

?J

.0

f

PLAINTIFF'S
EXHIBIT

13

A
(£, £12.06)
(4, 000.00) ^ ) \
(£, 000. 00) t>
( 56£. 7 7 ) - l \ ^ ^
(1, 135.58)
(5,000.00)
(1? 500.00)
(1,500.00)

1

550-75

Page £
BALANCE FORWARD
7- Checks paid from HRCG in 1990
1/18/90
#333
3/££
41£
BALANCE

550.75

<l,£G<f. 13)
(15,OOO.OO)
(15,713.38)

Q-^0QilS_SyGGESIED_CQh!PROMlSE/gFFER =

%0td

a- Pay the installation/sales of $8,5uO
(adjusted for PC89)
b. Credit you for April, June, October, Nov, Dec
of 1989 and for Jar*, Feb, March, and April of 1990
for giving two demos each of those months since
you were busy doing customer support. 9 months at
$£500/month is $££500. Remaining 1£ months are
at $1£50 or $15,000. TOTAL OF $37,500.
c. Reduce onl_y half of the monies by;f30/>/*finee you
did not sell £ systems in either 1989 or 1990. 5 0 *
of^$37,500 is $18750 and 3 0 * reduction is <r$56£J*>less
or $13,1£5. $13,1£5 is added to remaining $16750 for
a total of $31,875.
31,875.00
$£4,G61.6£

BALANCE DUE E<ARB

3 75^00
d . I will pay you $15,000 cash within 5 days of the check^li 1*^
clearing from either Bishop Trust or l-IMSA of Hawaii. \SlS&.

e. Remainder due Barb Crouse will be held in a promissory-^ncrtre
paying
1E% annual
interest only compounded
monthly and paid
annually as of
the date this offer is agreed
to in writing
by
both parties. HRCG agrees if the bank account
of HRCG has more
than $60,000 after all expenses outstariding, that HRCG will cash
in promissory note to Barb Crouse.
I hope you will continue to show the good faith and efforts that
you have in the past Brtd if you desire to change our Agreement,
that
you will
so notify me.
I want ^xrtd need
your help and
support.

Sincerely:
SI

Rob J. Thurston

m
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

BARBARA CROUSE,

]
]1

Plaintiff,
vs.

]

HUMAN RESOURCES CONSULTING
GROUP, INC., a Utah corporation, and
ROBERT J. THURSTON, an individual,

]
]
;
)
]

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case No. 920904676

I find the facts to be as follows. Plaintiff was employed by the defendant
under an oral agreement on a yearly wage plus medical insurance. On January 15, 1989,
plaintiff and defendant entered into a written agreement whereby plaintiff was to perform
consulting services and demonstrations on behalf of defendant. Finding that defendant
operated under that contract and about November 1989, the defendant asked the plaintiff
to give customer support services. Plaintiff did, which made it such that she could not
get out to do demonstrations

This lasted until about the end of October 1990.

Plaintiff felt she was not being properly compensated and submitted to the
defendant a billing, exhibits 3 - 8 , for a total of approximately $48,600 owed to her.

Memorandum Decision
Case No. 920904676
Page 2
Defendant responded in a letter dated October 7, plaintiffs exhibit 9, which disputed one
of the billings and made a suggested offer. On October 4, plaintiff further made a written
offer that has been submitted as plaintiffs exhibits 10, 11, and 13.

Plaintiff wrote

defendant under letter dated October 18, which objected primarily to paragraph 8C of
defendant's offer.
I hold there was a meeting between the parties wherein the letter of October
4, written by the defendant, was used as the basis of their negotiations. Paragraph 8C was
the basic area of renegotiation. Exhibit 13 shows in dark, bold ink the figure $28,911.62,
which would indicate that this was the final offer.

Written there under is the figure

$5,675, which was added to it, bringing the final figure to $34,536.62. Defendant admits
that the bold ink is his writing but denies that he added the $5,675 onto that figure and
that it is not his writing. In looking at it carefully, it appears that the defendant has an
unusual way of making the figure "2" that shows up in the bold and also in the final
figure. I hold that the preponderance of the evidence indicates that the defendant did
write that figure and that the final agreed figure was $34,536.62. This end figure being
negotiated down from the requested $48,600.

Defendant agreed to pay $15,000

immediately and a note to follow. A check for $14,000 was paid.
I hold there was an agreement between the parties for employment. There
was a dispute as to compensation.

There was a meeting between the parties and an

accord was reached. That $14,000 was paid in partial satisfaction of that accord.

Memorandum Decision
Case No. 920904676
Page 3
After plaintiff decided to resign, defendant had a change of heart and then
made claim for additional amounts that plaintiff owed to him which included some repair
to equipment, health insurance, etc. Health insurance was never mentioned in the written
contract. It was granted to plaintiff when she went to work and it just continued. There
was no mention at any time of any repayment until after the accord and satisfaction. As
to the claims for the repair on her equipment, I hold this was mutually to his benefit at
the time, and it was not expected to be repaid. In any event these were matters that he
had knowledge at the time of the meeting and at the time of reaching the accord.
I hold for the plaintiff for the balance of the unpaid amount agreed to in
their accord for $20,536.62, together with interest and costs.
Plaintiffs counsel to prepare findings, conclusions and judgment in
accordance with this decision.
Dated this / Q

day of August 1994.

0 0005 4
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the \l? of August 1994,1 sent a true and correct
copy of the foregoing Memorandum Decision to counsel as follows:
Randy B. Birch
WALSTAD & BABCOCK
Attorneys for Plaintiff
254 West 400 South, #200
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Christopher A. Tolboe
MURPHY, TOLBOE & MAYBE
Attorney for Defendants
124 South 600 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84102

JL

irt(£lerk *
Deputy Court

0 0 0 i\ Fi r>
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Third Juiiels! P;c'*fK t

Brian J. Babcock, Esq T(6rm———f
WALSTAD & BABCOCK
Attorneys for Plaintiff
57 West South Temple, 8th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 531-7000

SEP 3 0 1S34
SALTLA>i£CO'r^>y.
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
BARBARA CROUSE,
[t>"c/^9'i/

JUDGMENT
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No- 920904676CN

HUMAN RESOURCES CONSULTING GROUP,
INC., a Utah corporation, and
ROBERT J. THURSTON, an individual,

Judge Ronald O. Hyde

Defendants.
The subject case came on for trial before the Honorable Ronald
O. Hyde, sitting without a jury.
1994.

The trial was held on July 26,

Plaintiff was represented by Brian J. Babcock, of Walstad &

Babcock.

Defendants were represented by Christopher A. Tolboe, of

Murphy, Tolboe & Maybe.

The Court, having previously made its

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, hereby orders:
1.

Judgment

is

entered

in

favor

of

Plaintiff

against

Defendant Human Resources Consulting Group, Inc. in the sum of
$20,536.62, together with prejudgment interest of $8,050.35 through
September 25, 1994, with a per diem rate of $5.63 thereafter until
the date hereof, and costs of $191.00.

Interest on the judgment

shall accrue post-judgment interest at the statutory rate.
2.

The Complaint against Defendant Robert J. Thurston is

dismissed with prejudice.

0 0 0056

3.

The Counterclaim of Defendant Human Resources Consulting

Group, Inc. and Defendant Robert J. Thurston is dismissed with
prejudice.
DATED this 3 o

day of

^UJlfc

1994
BY THE COURT

iRONALD 0.£^&
HYDE
f?\i>^

District Court Ju

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that on this Z[ day of September 1994, I caused a
true and correct copy of the foregoing JUDGMENT to be mailed,
postage prepaid, to Christopher A. Tolboe, 124 South 600 East, Salt
Lake City, Utah 84102.

BJB\hd:cros-hrc.j ud

0 0 0 0 5",

T h h x ? . \ -/<wia' P»"^r«*t
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SEP 3 0 1S34
SAL^LAktCol^tY
B>.

Brian J. Babcock #6172
WALSTAD & BABCOCK
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Temple View Centre
57 West South Temple, 8th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
(801) 531-7000
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
BARBARA CROUSE,
AFFIDAVIT OF COSTS
Plaintiff,
vs.
HUMAN RESOURCES CONSULTING
GROUP, INC., a Utah
corporation, and ROBERT J.
THURSTON, an individual

Civil No. 920904676CN
Judge Ronald 0. Hyde

Defendants.
STATE OF UTAH

)
:ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
Brian J. Babcock, being first duly sworn upon oath, hereby
deposes and says as follows:
1.

I am an attorney licensed to practice law within the

State of Utah, and I am an associate attorney with the law firm of
WALSTAD & BABCOCK.
2.

I am familiar with the prevailing rates and costs charged

by attorneys in the community for services rendered similar to

00005b

those which our fin mi rendered for the Plaintiff in connection wri th
the above-captioned matter.
3.
Plaintiff

"1 In

ioilowing

is a break

«IHH

II couli.

i inr.iii i t*« I by

jnnection with the above-entitled matter:

08/20/92

$

80.00

09. 25, 92

Service Fee - Summons & Complai nt

$

3 4.50

0 7 / 2 6 * 94

Service Fee - Subpoena

:>

76,50

TOTAL COSTS INCURRED TO DATE:
DATED tl l i s

2lL

day of September

$ 191.00

Ill 994,

BRIAN J./BABCOCK
SUBSCRIBED / 1 II SWOR I I I 1 N *fc >i e :i • • i 1 :hi s
1994.

day o f September',

i s.

NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing i\\ :

ll '
dim
IMt

/ k ^

L„.
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the
foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF COSTS to be mailed, postage prepaid, to
Christopher A. Tolboe 124 South 600 East, #100, Salt Lake City,
Utah 84102, this Z/J/" day of September, 1994.

10 4 7 ex oi use af f
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0 0 0 0 5S
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SEP 3 0 m
Brian J. Babcock, Esq. (6172)
WALSTAD & BABCOCK
Attorneys for Plaintiff
57 West South Temple, 8th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 531-7000

SALT LAKE COUv . Y

By-

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
BARBARA CROUSE,
FINDINGS OF FACT and
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. 920904676CN

HUMAN RESOURCES CONSULTING GROUP,
INC., a Utah corporation, and
ROBERT J. THURSTON, an individual,

Judge Ronald O. Hyde

Defendants.
The subject case came on for trial before the Honorable Ronald
O. Hyde, sitting without a jury.
1994.

Plaintiff was represented by Brian J. Babcock, of Walstad &

Babcock.

Defendants were represented by Christopher A. Tolboe, of

Murphy, Tolboe & Maybe.
both

The trial was held on July 26,

oral

and

arguments of

The Court having considered the evidence,

documentary,

presented

by

the

parties

and

the

the respective counsel, the Court now makes

the

following:

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Plaintiff is an individual who previously resided in Salt

Lake County,

State of Utah, and now resides

in the State of

Arizona.

000060

Defendant Human Resources Consulting Group, Inc. ("HRCG")
in <i Utah i r irporatd

lr

S

of Utah,
3

Defendant:

Robert

J

Thurs 1 :o.

(tfThurston" )

is

ani

individual residing i i i Sal t Lake Coi n ifcjS ta/te of I J" tat i.
4

1

I Iii]l aintiff was con tacted by I hi irston

February 1988

i : = .garding providing services for HRCG for which Plaintiff would be

reimbursed for all expenses associated witi i the sex vices provided.
II, or abou t January J 5if 1989,. Plaintiff and HRCG entered
in 1 I mi 'i i

a g r e e m e i :t. I:

i; ,i I: ler e b y

PJ ad n ti f f

\ ras fcc | u»r f n r m

consulting services and demonstrations on behal f of HRCG.
I).

Plaintiff

d e m o n s ! i mil, i o n *

performed

in I i c l i i i I II

consulting

I HRn i

ii|

servi ces

il: I til ] a t ::: I L I: I I ::: ember

and
1 989.

I i November 1909, Foxware, a company which was providi ng
customer support services for HRCG, indicated i t would i 10 longer be
:::::i is Ill:: Dmer si lppor t ser vd ces.
November 1989, Thurston directed Plaintiff to gr '•• '
the office of Foxware and provide the customer

Sll pp 0 rt

serviuco,

11 in in in i mi in in in mi i mi in I in in in i in in i mi
"in

fter woi l
'
i inq in the offices of Foxware for approximately

one month, Plaintiff moved to the offi ce of HRCG and continued
me x

si IJ::: p c :i : t

M c:

it: Il i:

rit :i i

E•

ma' ::i = :ii I:

E .• i :::1 :

;

I: I i I

could not leave the office to perform, demonstr atioi is.
Plaintiff continued perfor ming customer support work for
Jill

,

rtobei

IUll)'0.
2

A

/i

f\

i\

fi

.^

11.

During the time period in which Plaintiff was performing

customer support services, Plaintiff felt that she was not being
properly

compensated.

At

the request

of

Thurston,

Plaintiff

prepared and submitted billings wherein Plaintiff believed she was
owed approximately $48,600 from HRCG.
12.

HRCG responded to these billings on or about October 2,

1990, questioning some of the invoices submitted by Plaintiff.
HRCG presented a proposal for payment

for Plaintiff's services

performed.
13.

HRCG, on or about October 4, 1990, provided an accounting

breakdown as to HRCG's position along with an offer of $24,661.62
as payment for Plaintiff's services performed.
14.

Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff and Thurston met to discuss

the settlement proposal using the October 4, 1990, letter as a
beginning point.

During this meeting, Thurston made handwritten

changes to the October 4, 1990, letter changing

the offer to

$28,911.62 for Plaintiff's services performed.
15.

On or about October 18, 1990, Plaintiff wrote a letter to

HRCG indicating that she was in agreement with the modifications
made to the October 4, 1990, as discussed, except for paragraph 8c.
16.

Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff and Thurston met again to

discuss paragraph 8c.
Plaintiff

an

In this meeting, Thurston agreed to pay

additional

$5,625

from

paragraph

8c.

Thurston

handwrote $5625 below the previous offer, and Thurston handwrote
$34,536.62 at the bottom of the page.

Plaintiff accepted this

settlement offer of $34,536.62,
3

000062

18.
1990,

On o r

abifnuL

After

giving

Plaintiff

October

2i\

w* ^wi v... «*

provided w r i n

t

1TRCG p a i d

ra»_

on,

HI i

ification

anothc
19 •

in 1 n

t o HRCG t h a i

III'" I I mi in in il in f II

I

I" I,

III" I' 111,

i

I

.sill to was

a 1 Le i

11 no •. 11" 1.1 J t' ino 111 I i 11 I

surance

.

and

HRCG a t t e m p t e d

equi pment

repairs

<i.>*. , Lff

HRCG has not made any more payments on the balance of

$ 2 0 , "in \ h In. t\ I

From,
f f)l

:

1 in 1 1 1 "' •

previously paid by UJRtX on be
20.

MIIIH

ompany.

On o r a b o u t D e c e m b e r

Il in in 11'("

Plaintiff

ml i nil, i" I i

b e e n r e a c h e d a n d o n o p a y m e n t made on t h e s e t t l e m e n t ,
t

to

the

mi

foregoing

Find!rigs

of

Fact,,

the

Court

makc.s

"the

II I, J lit! II III I I

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

T l l O l t - 1 Wil"

-ilIH »KJT €>OIM*nl

Plaintiff was to provide services ioi

•*

-a>

Plaintiff for the servi ces.
2.

Tlion.. 1 cii i use

«i ( l i s p u 11;

iii;

I < i I linn

IIIIIIIH MIII

I

n) I < ' o m p e n s a t : lion

Plaintiff was entitled to for services performed.
3.
an

dccoul

4.

There was negotiation holwoon I ho parties and ultimately
Wri". i e a c l i e i I

iiiiii

III m

iiiiiii KIIIIII I

Il

I I *»]fi <>,'

HRCG has paid $14,1)1)0 in paitiaJ

satisfaction of that

accord.

4
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5.

HRCG has breached

said accord by failing to pay the

outstanding balance, that being $20,536.62, plus interest.
6.

HRCG agreed to pay, and has paid, Plaintiff f s health

insurance, for which HRCG is not entitled to reimbursement.
7.

HRCG agreed to pay, and has paid, for equipment repairs

which were to HRCG's benefit, for which HRCG is not entitled to
reimbursement.
8.

HRCG

had

knowledge

at

the

time

of

the

settlement

negotiations and settlement agreement of the facts regarding the
health insurance costs and equipment repairs such that any alleged
claim for said items was resolved in the accord.
9.

Plaintiff is entitled to damages against HRCG by reason

of foregoing breach of the accord in the amount of $20,536.62.
10.

Plaintiff is entitled to interest on the foregoing sum at

the statutory rate of 10% commencing October 25, 1990, until the
date hereof.
11.

Plaintiff

is entitled

to its costs incurred

in this

action in the amount of $191.00.
12.

Plaintiff's cause of action against Thurston personally

is dismissed.
13.

HRCG and Thurston's Counterclaim against Plaintiff is

dismissed with prejudice.
14.

Plaintiff is entitled to have judgment entered against

HRCG in the sum of $20,536.62, together with prejudgment interest
of $8,050.35 through September 25, 1994, with a per diem rate of
$5.63 thereafter until the date hereof, and costs of $191.00.
5

000064

Interest on the judgment shall accrue post-judgment interest at the
:

i t, a ti 11ory ra tie.

DATED t h i s

J 0

da;;, "^
ol _

\xj(XlPt
&<<

,

I "lll 1.

BY THE COURT

RONALDOTHYDE
District Court Jud

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that on this 7,1 day of September 1994 r 1 caused a
true and correct copy of the foregoing FINDING OF FACT and
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to be mailed, postage prepaid, to Christopher A.
Tolboe, 124 South 600 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102.

BJB\hd:cros-hrc.ff

6
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, the undersigned, hereby certify that on this

day of April, 1995, I

caused two true and correct copies of the foregoing "Brief of the Appellee" to be
Inailed, pootcigo propaJd, to:
Christopher A. Tolboe
MURPHY, TOLBOE, & MABEY, P.C.
124 South 600 East, Suite #100
Salt Lake City, UT 84102

nu^JtfJte/

